In the transition to Einstein’s theory of Special Relativity (SR), certain concepts that had previously been thought to be univocal or absolute properties of systems turn out not to be. For instance, mass bifurcates into (i) the relativistically invariant proper mass m0, and (ii) the mass relative to an inertial frame in which it is moving at a speed v = βc, its relative mass m, whose quantity is a factor γ = (1 – β2) -1/2 times the proper mass, (...) m = γm0. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that the Elementary Process Theory (EPT) agrees with the knowledge of the physical world obtained from the successful predictions of Special Relativity (SR). For that matter, a recently developed method is applied: a categorical model of the EPT that incorporates SR is fully specified. Ultimate constituents of the universe of the EPT are modeled as point-particles, gamma-rays, or time-like strings, all represented by integrable hyperreal functions on Minkowski space. This proves that the (...) EPT agrees with SR. -/- Edit: this preprint differs significantly from the published chapter. (shrink)

On creation and Hindu cosmology in verse form; translated from Oriya.

Collection of seminar papers on concept of creation in Hindu philosophy.

The notion of a weakly scattered theory T is defined. T need not be scattered. For each a model of T, let sr() be the Scott rank of . Assume sr() ≤ ω\sp A \sb 1 for all a model of T. Let σ\sp T \sb 2 be the least Σ₂ admissible ordinal relative to T. If T admits effective k-splitting as defined in this paper, then θσ\cal Aθ\cal A$ a model of T.

Structural Realism (SR) is typically rated as a moderate realist doctrine about the ultimate entities of nature described by fundamental physics. Whether it must be extended to the higher-level special sciences is not so clear. In this short paper I argue that there is no need to ‘structuralize’ the special sciences. By mounting concrete examples I show that structural descriptions and structural laws certainly play a role in the special sciences, but that they don’t play any exclusive role nor that (...) they give us any reason to believe that all that there is on the various levels is structure. I fortify my points by arguing that structures are global entities (in order for SR not to collapse into a bundle ontology) and that the assumption of higher-level structures as genuinely global or holistic entities is even more arcane. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 111-120 [Access article in PDF] Hobbes on Law, Nature, and Reason Kinch Hoekstra Balliol College, University of Oxford The reason of a thing is not to bee inquired after till you are sure the thing it selfe bee soe. Wee comonly are att (What's the reason of it?) before wee are sure of the thing. T'was an excellent question of my (...) Lady Cotton, when Sr. Robert Cotton was magnifying of a shoe, wch was Moses's or Noahs, & Wondering att the strange shape & fashion of it: but, Mr. Cotton, sayes shee, are you sure 'tis a shooe. 1A law of nature is a rule discovered by reason. 2 This is the key to John Deigh's attempt to show that "Hobbes's ethics is logically independent of his moral psychology." 3 By this he means that the "theorems" of Hobbes's ethics, the laws of nature, "have no other ground than the definition on which it [his ethics] is based." 4 Deigh thinks he establishes this conclusion by taking seriously both Hobbes's definition of a law of nature as "a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life," and his definition of reason as "nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names." 5 Deigh puts these two definitions together to argue that Hobbes's ethics is a deductive science, and that those who instead think of his ethics as dependent on desire or as involving instrumental reason ("means-to-ends thinking," as he calls it) are mistaken. The particular virtue of this interpretation, Deigh says, is that without it we have to read Hobbes in the Leviathan as sometimes using "reason" in a way that is different from the way he defines it in chapter 5. 6I will argue that Deigh misunderstands the basis, status, and scope of Hobbesian natural law. In his attempt to save Hobbes from using "reason" equivocally, Deigh attributes mistakes and inconsistencies to him that are more serious and have less [End Page 111] textual justification than that apparent equivocation. A source of the misunderstanding is a simplification—accepted by Mark Murphy and many other interpreters—of Hobbes's conception of reason.Let us begin with Deigh's view of the scope of the law of nature, as he admits that his interpretation would be undermined were he wrong about this. "While the laws of nature are dictates of reason for people living in a state of nature," he says, "they are not truly laws in such circumstances and therefore not sources of obligation in them." 7 If Murphy is right that Hobbes does think they are obligatory outside of civil society, then it is, Deigh concedes, "a genuine problem" for his account. 8 In reply, Deigh refers to the two passages where Hobbes says that the laws of nature are "not properly Lawes," quoting the one from chapter 26, which explicitly recapitulates a claim from chapter 15. 9 In this earlier passage, however, Hobbes adds: "But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes." 10 Hobbes thinks that the laws of nature are always obligatory. He holds, for example, that the law of nature that covenants be kept obliges even "in the condition of meer Nature" or "condition of Warre," and that "the rule of Manners, without Civill Government, is the Law of Nature." 11 Hobbes says that although the laws of nature donot always oblige "in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act," they do always "oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place." 12 Although they only require "a desire, and endeavour," Hobbes makes clear that these requirements are laws, and that they are binding and obligatory. 13If Deigh were right, sovereigns would not be obligated by... (shrink)

Two recently proposed experiments by Kolen and Torr (K-T), designed to detect possible failures of Einstein's special relativity (SR) are analyzed. Imprecisions in these papers are pointed out. Computation in Lorentz aether theory (LAT), with the K-T violation of SR, of the theoretical prediction for the proposed K-T clock experiment prove their results to be incorrect. Analytical computation of the proposed K-T rotor Doppler experiment using LAT confirms the order of magnitude of their prediction by numerical computation. For LAT in (...) the K-T form, this experiment, using a turntable, is shown to give results which could be detected with the technology of 20 years ago. Another LAT model is considered which leads to deviations of SR smaller than in the K-T model. The central point of the approach adopted in this paper is the use of Einstein's coordinates in the comoving frame, even when SR is violated, leading always to isotropic propagation of light in vacuum; the anisotropy usually obtained in LAT is only a coordinate effect. (shrink)

BackgroundStory recall tests have shown variable sensitivity to rate of cognitive decline in individuals with Alzheimer’s disease biomarkers. Although SR tasks are typically scored by obtaining a sum of items recalled, item-level analyses may provide additional sensitivity to change and AD processes. Here, we examined the difficulty and discrimination indices of each item from the Logical Memory SR task, and determined if these metrics differed by recall conditions, story version, lexical categories, serial position, and amyloid status.Methodsn = 1,141 participants from (...) the Wisconsin Registry for Alzheimer’s Prevention longitudinal study who had item-level data were included in these analyses, as well as a subset of n = 338 who also had amyloid positron emission tomography imaging. LM data were categorized into four lexical categories, and by serial position. We calculated difficulty and discriminability/memorability by item, category, and serial position and ran separate repeated measures ANOVAs for each recall condition, lexical category, and serial position. For the subset with amyloid imaging, we used a two-sample t-test to examine whether amyloid positive and amyloid negative groups differed in difficulty or discrimination for the same summary metrics.ResultsIn the larger sample, items were more difficult in the delayed recall condition across both story A and story B. Item discrimination was higher at delayed than immediate recall, and proper names had better discrimination than any of the other lexical categories or serial position groups. In the subsample with amyloid PET imaging, proper names were more difficult for Aβ+ than Aβ−; items in the verb and “other” lexical categories and all serial positions from delayed recall were more discriminate for the Aβ+ group compared to the Aβ− group.ConclusionThis study provides empirical evidence that both LM stories are effective at discriminating ability levels and amyloid status, and that individual items vary in difficulty and discrimination by amyloid status, while total scores do not. These results can be informative for the future development of sensitive tasks or composite scores for early detection of cognitive decline. (shrink)

In this paper, my objective is to show how Sankarāchārya's concept of reality is deferent from the Kantian notion of reality, despite many similarities between them. Cartesian skepticism of universal doubt is a challenge for the Kantian notion of reality; however, it can't be applied to Sankarāchārya's concept of reality because of the acceptance of different paradigm to explain the reality and Sankarāchārya's non-representationalistic approach towards the reality. The attack on representationalism can't be applicable to Sankarāchārya's philosophy.

Laland and colleagues have sought to challenge the proximate–ultimate distinction claiming that it imposes a unidirectional model of causation, is limited in its capacity to account for complex biological phenomena, and hinders progress in biology. In this article the core of their argument is critically analyzed. It is claimed that contrary to their claims Laland et al. rely upon the proximate–ultimate distinction to make their points and that their alternative conception of reciprocal causation refers to phenomena that were already accounted (...) for by standard theory. (shrink)

We propose a rational method for addressing an important question—who deserves to be an author of a scientific article? We review various contentious issues associated with this question and recommend that the scientific community should view authorship in terms of contributions and responsibilities, rather than credits. We propose a new paradigm that conceptually divides a scientific article into four basic elements: ideas, work, writing, and stewardship. We employ these four fundamental elements to modify the well-known International Committee of Medical Journal (...) Editors (ICMJE) authorship guidelines. The modified ICMJE guidelines are then used as the basis to develop an approach to quantify individual contributions and responsibilities in multi-author articles. The outcome of the approach is an authorship matrix, which can be used to answer several nagging questions related to authorship. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate the flow of MHD mixed convection nanofluid flow under nonlinear heated due to an extending surface. The transfer of heat in nanofluid subject to a magnetic field and boundary conditions of convective is studied to obtain the physical meaning of the convection phenomenon. The governing partial differential equations of the boundary layer are reduced to ordinary differential equations considering a technique of the transformation of similarity. The transformed equations are solved numerically considering (...) the technique of an efficient numerical shooting applying the Runge–Kutta technique scheme from the fourth-fifth order. The results corresponding to the dimensionless speed, temperature, concentration profiles, and the Nusselt number reduced, and the Sherwood numbers are presented by figures to display the physical meaning of the phenomena. A comparison has been made between the obtained results with the previous results obtained by others and agrees with them if the new parameters vanish. The results obtained indicate the impacts of the nondimensional governing parameters, namely, magnetic field parameter M, Soret number Sr, heat source λ, thermal buoyancy parameter λ T, and solutal buoyancy parameter λ C on the flow, temperature, and concentration profiles being discussed and presented graphically. (shrink)

The paper surveys Floridi’s attempt for laying down informational structural realism. After considering a number of reactions to the pars destruens of Floridi’s attack on the digital ontology, I show that Floridi’s enterprise for enriching the ISR by borrowing elements from the ontic form of structural realism is blighted by a haunting inconsistency. ISR has been originally developed by Floridi as a restricted and level dependent form of structural realism which remains mainly bonded within the borders of a Kantian perspective. (...) I argue that this perspective doesn’t mesh nicely with the ontic interpretation that Floridi attached to the ISR. I substantiate this claim through the assessment of Floridi’s strategy for reconciling the epistemic and ontic forms of the SR, as well as by close examination of his use of method of levels of abstraction and his notion of semantic information. My proposal is that the ISR could be defended best against the mentioned and similar objections by being interpreted as an extension of the epistemic SR. (shrink)

In his Analysis of Matter, Russell advocated an epistemic form of Epistemic Structural Realism which held that our knowledge of the external world is structural. This approach has been criticised by M.H.A. Newman, 137–148, 1928) and Stathis Psillos, S13–S24, 2001). The paper aims to reconstruct Russell’s version of ESR, and defend its experimental and philosophical plausibility. The basic assumption is that without getting a viable experimental handle on the linkage between the structure of perceptions and causal structure of the stimuli, (...) the so called upward path to SR couldn’t be defended conclusively. In this vein, the paper explores the resources of the recent experimental theories of perception. These help establishing a structuralist account of the perception, and provide an account for the causal linkage between the structure of perceptions and the structure of the stimuli. I argue that it is possible to settle for objectivity of this linkage according to the criteria of comprehensiveness, simplicity, and above all rationality, in a way that meets the standards of the scientific realists. (shrink)

Tamil translation with original Sanskrit text on Śaktiviśiṣṭādvaitavedānta.

Bird’s Ultimate Argument sought to show that Armstrong’s N relationships involving categorical universals can’t entail nomic regularities. In N’s place Bird offered the non-categorical SR relation. Two kinds of objection have been raised: either Bird’s own alternative metaphysics fails in just the same way as Armstrong’s or the target of Bird’s argument may anyway have a way out of the problem. My aim is to reclaim the victory for Bird. I argue that the responses in defence of Armstong’s N relationships (...) fail to acknowledge that Bird was explicitly concerned with Armstrong’s commitment to a categoricalist view of universals. Moreover, Bird’s alternative account does not suffer the same problem since his metaphysics of properties is essentialist. Nevertheless, Bird’s account does need elaborating on to explainwhySR relationships entail their regularities. I offer Schaffer’s Axiomatic Solution as a candidate for this purpose. (shrink)

On Visishtadvaita vedanta philosophy of Rāmānuja, 1017-1137, Hindu philosopher.

Scientific Realists argue that it would be a miracle if scientific theories were getting more predictive without getting closer to the truth; so they must be getting closer to the truth. Van Fraassen, Laudan et al. argue that owing to the underdetermination of theory by data (UDT) for all we know, it is a miracle, a fluke. So we should not believe in even the approximate truth of theories. I argue that there is a test for who is right: suppose (...) we are at the limit of inquiry. Suppose that we then have all the logically possible theories that are adequate to all the actual data. If they all resembled in their theoretical claims, since one of them must be true, all of them would then resemble it, whichever it is. We would thus be justified in saying they all approximated the truth in the degree to which they co-resembled. If they don't all co-resemble, the SRs are wrong; more predictive theories are not necessarily closer to the theoretical truth. Prior to the limit, if, in spite of our best efforts to the contrary, all the theories we can make adequate to current data tend to co-resemble, we have inductive warrant for thinking more predictive theories are closer to the truth. If they don't resemble, we have inductive warrant for thinking that more predictive theories are not necessarily closer to the truth. (shrink)